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On 2 June 2009, the Queensland government announced a program of asset 
sales projected to realise $15 billion. In this paper, the public case for 
privatisation put forward by the Queensland government is case is shown to be 
wrong and, in important respects, deliberately misleading. It is argued that the 
presentation of a spurious case for privatisation has contributed to poor policy 
decisions regarding the choice of assets to be sold, the failure to restructure the 
rail industry to promote competiton, and the adoption of inferior methods for 
sale. 3 
 
Bad politics makes bad policy: the case of Queensland’s asset 
sales program 
 
On 2 June 2009, the Queensland government announced a program of asset 
sales projected to realise $15 billion. The announcement came as a surprise to 
most Queenslanders, since the government had just been re-elected on a 
platform that reiterated the Labor party’s long-standing opposition to 
privatisation. Furthermore, the government had repeatedly rejected speculation 
that QR was being prepared for privatisation (Hall and Ludlow 2007, 
McCullough 2008). 
The government argued that the sale was necessitated by the adverse effects of 
the global financial crisis on its long-term fiscal position, and that the sale 
proceeds would permit increased expenditure on social infrastructure such as  
schools and hospitals. These claims were amplified in a booklet, entitled  ‘The 
Myths vs The Facts: Queensland Asset Sales’ distributed to all Queensland 
households at public expense. This booklet, reproduced online with some 
additional material (Queensland Treasury 2010), remains the only official 
statement of the case for the asset sales. 
On 24 Nov 2009, a group of more than 20 leading Australian economists issued a 
statement (Quiggin et al 2009). The statement and accompanying press release 
are reproduced in the Appendix. The statement pointed out that the claim that 
the proceeds from the sale of assets could be used to finance investment in 
schools and hospitals was economically unsound, and that the fiscal arguments 
presented in support of the asset sales were economically invalid. This statement 
followed an earlier critique (Walker and Walker 2009) produced for the 
Queensland Council of Unions, which criticised the fiscal case for the sales. 
The government, which had criticised the Walker report in very sharp terms, 
made no formal response to this statement, other than to say that it ‘stood by’ its 4 
claims. At the time of writing, the ‘Facts and Myths’ booklet, replete with 
spurious claims, remains the official position. 
Some economists who support the asset sales program, including Sim (2009) 
have argued that, although the fiscal arguments put forward by the government 
are invalid, the asset sales will nonetheless prove beneficial. Similar arguments 
have previously been presented by Gittins (2008). 
In this paper, it will be shown that these arguments cannot be sustained. Policy 
marketed on false premises will be influenced, in its design and implementation, 
by those premises and will therefore lead to adverse outcomes. Two examples 
illustrate this point: the decision to privatise the Queensland Rail coal freight 
business as a vertically-integrated near-monopoly and the government’s rejection 
of congestion pricing for roads. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the fiscal position of the 
Queensland government. It is shown that, while Queensland’s finances have 
been affected by the financial crisis, the position is almost certainly better than 
was expected in February 2009, prior to the 2009 state election. Section 2 deals 
with the fiscal effects of asset sales, and restates the standard analysis showing 
that, other things equal, the sale of an income earning asset will have zero effect 
on net worth. Considering factors that might change this conclusion in particular 
cases, it is argued that the sale of Queensland Forests may yield net benefits, but 
that the sale of Queensland Motorways is likely to result in a net loss. Section 3 
deals with the public case for privatisation put forward by the Queensland 
government. This is case is shown to be wrong and, in important respects, 
deliberately misleading. In Section 4, it is argued that the presentation of a 
spurious case for privatisation has contributed to poor policy decisions regarding 
the choice of assets to be sold, the failure to restructure QR prior to sale, and the 
sale mechanism adopted for QR. Finally, some concluding comments are offered. 5 
1. The fiscal position of the Queensland government 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the fiscal position of the Queensland state 
government was generally strong. Largely by virtue of the long-standing policy of 
fully funding superannuation benefits for public employees, Queensland had 
substantially positive financial net worth, in contrast with other states. 
However, rapid population growth, driven largely by interstate migration, 
entailed a continuing requirement for investment in public infrastructure. On 
the other hand, while increased population implied increased revenue, most of 
this additional revenue was required to meet additional requirements for current 
expenditure, leaving an inadequate surplus to service additional debt. 
Nevertheless, until the onset of the global financial crisis, the state appeared to 
be in a good position to finance necessary investment. The crisis led to a rapid 
downgrading of expected future revenues while having little effect on projected 
expenditure requirements. 
By February 2009, the estimated decline in revenue over the forward estimates 
period from 2008-09 to 2011-12, had reached $12 billion relative to the 2008–09 
budget. The state government announced that, in the absence of measures to 
reduce capital expenditure, it anticipated a downgrading of its debt by Standard 
& Poors. The government announced that expenditure levels would be 
maintained, and on February 21, S&P downgraded the bonds of the Queensland 
Treasury Corporation from AAA to AA+. In March 2009, the government was 
re-elected. 
The economic and financial outlook continued to deteriorate during the early 
months of 2009, but by the second quarter of the year, tentative evidence of a 
global economic recovery was becoming apparent, as evidence by US Fed Reserve 
Chairman Bernanke’s reference, on 15 March 2009, to ‘green shoots’. The 
stimulus packages introduced by the Australian government in October 2008 
and February 2009 had softened the impact of the crisis on the domestic 6 
economy. These packages were complemented by the strongly expansionary 
budget introduced in May 2009. 
Nevertheless, on June 2, 2009, the Queensland State Treasurer, Andrew Fraser 
announced that the shortfall in forward estimates had reached $15 billion, and 
that this necessitated a range of measures that breached previous commitments, 
including the abolition of the state subsidy for motor fuel1
The change in the shortfall since the February statement was relatively modest 
($3 billion over 4 years) and rapidly reversed by subsequent developments. The 
December 2009 projected cumulative operating deficits of $11 billion for the 
period from 2009-10 to 2012-13, and the outlook has improved significantly since 
then. Given the mildness of the recession, it seems clear that the ultimate 
shortfall in revenue, relative to the 2008-09 budget forecast, will be much 
smaller than the $15 billion predicted by the Queensland government and 
Treasury. 
, and the sale of a 
range of public assets.  
The politically convenient gloominess of the  outlook presented to justify the 
proposed asset sales provoked severe criticism from Walker and Walker (2009) 
who argued that the fiscal position was much better than claimed. The 
government offered no substantive response, but vigorously attacked the 
qualifications and competence of the authors of the report, suggesting that no 
serious economist would question the sale. This line of attack was dropped after 
the release of the 20 economists statement, but still no substantive defence of the 
government’s position was offered. 
                                            
1 Although the fuel subsidy is not the primary focus of this paper, it is useful to consider the 
impact of this policy change, which turned out to be relatively uncontroversial by comparison 
with the asset sales. The annual expenditure on the fuel subsidy was about $550 million in 
2008-09. At an interest rate of 6 per cent, this would be sufficient to service a debt of about $9  
billion. From the state government’s viewpoint this represents a pure gain in expenditure. By 
contrast, although the proposed asset sales may yield a large gross return this return is almost 
entirely offset by the need to repay debt associated with the assets and by the loss of equity 
income, as will be shown below. 7 
Without independent evidence it is difficult to resolve this dispute. 
Unfortunately, the willingness of Queensland Treasury to promote obviously 
spurious arguments, and deceptively presented statistics, in support of 
privatisation means that the usual presumption that Treasury estimates should 
be regarded as independent and apolitical cannot be applied in this case. 
More importantly, discussion of the government’s fiscal position is relevant only 
to the extent that asset sales can be expected to improve that position. This issue 
is addressed in the next section. 
2. The fiscal case for asset sales 
Before examining the case for privatisation put forward by the Queensland 
government, it is useful to consider the economic debate surrounding the fiscal 
impact of privatisation. The starting point for this observation is that, other 
things equal, the sale of an income earning asset, whether by a household, 
corporation, or government will have no effect on net worth. That is, the market 
value of the asset will be equal to the risk-adjusted present value of the 
anticipated flow of future earnings the asset will generate. 
More precisely, we may evaluate the fiscal impact of privatisation by comparing 
the sale price received by an asset with the present value of the expected flow of 
earnings (dividends, capital gains and, in the cases considered here, tax 
equivalent payments). The present value is obtained by discounting at a rate 
equal to the social opportunity cost of capital, when adjusted to take appropriate 
account of the risk characteristics of the income stream. 
If the sale price is greater (less) than the present value of earnings in continued 
public ownership, then privatisation yields a net fiscal benefit (loss).2
                                            
2 A number of other factors must be taken into account in assessing the net social impact of an 
asset sale. For example, if the asset is sold for less than its market value, the associated fiscal 
loss represents a transfer to buyers. If privatisation of a monopoly asset results in an increase in 
prices, the loss to consumers must be taken into account. These issues are discussed in Quiggin 
(1995). 
 Other 
things equal, we would expect that the flow of earnings would be unchanged as 8 
would be the discount rate used to evaluate them, and therefore that the sale 
price would be equal to the present value of future earnings, so that the fiscal 
impact of privatisation is zero. 
Other things are not always equal, however. Three factors are of particular 
importance.  The first of these tends to imply a net gain when public assets are 
sold, while the other two imply a net loss. 
First, where goods and services are produced and sold in competitive markets, 
private firms are likely to have lower operating costs and higher productivity 
than their public sector counterparts. In the case of competitive markets, 
political oversight of management decisions will not yield improved outcomes, 
even where those undertaking such oversight are solely concerned with 
achieving the best possible social outcome. On the other hand, if political control 
is used to benefit particular interest groups, such as employees, or influential 
groups of consumers, it will produce outcomes worse than those generated by 
competitive markets. 
Conversely, in the presence of externalities or natural monopoly, requiring 
extensive regulation, public ownership may yield improved outcomes (King and 
Pitchford 1998). A privately owned monopolist will be willing to expend 
substantial resources in regulatory contests to extract the highest possible rent 
from consumers. By contrast, for a publicly owned firm, the costs associated with 
higher prices are reflected in political pain for the shareholding ministers. 
The third, and most controversial, issue which may generate a difference 
between the sale price of an asset and its value in continued public ownership 
relates to the cost of capital. The weighted average cost of capital for a typical 
corporate asset is substantially higher than the rate of interest on government 
bonds. The difference is caused by the premium demanded by holders of equity, 
which is greatly in excess of the amount predicted by the Consumption-Based 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). This divergence has become known as the 
equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985). 9 
There has been vigorous debate over whether the equity premium represents an 
appropriate market adjustment for risk, implying that the true social cost of 
capital to the public sector is equal to the private sector cost of capital for 
projects with similar risk characteristics. Unfortunately, few, if any, proponents 
of this view have addressed the equity premium problem, and many have 
confused the pure risk premium discussed above with the adjustment to 
expected cash flows needed to take appropriate account of default risk.  
Grant and Quiggin (2003, 2004) argue that the equity premium is due, in large 
part, to the incompleteness of capital markets, and that the appropriate rate of 
discount for public sector cash flows is close to the real bond rate. The core of the 
argument is that the standard efficient markets hypothesis, as applied to 
CCAPM, requires that financial markets must be complete. In particular, 
individuals and firms must be able to insure themselves against exogenous 
systematic risk, such as the increased risk of unemployment or bankruptcy 
during a recession. In the presence of uninsurable background risk, investors 
will demand a higher premium for assets whose returns are correlated with that 
risk, such as corporate equity. 
Application to the proposed asset sales 
In the absence of any published business case or scoping study other than the 
deliberately misleading ‘Facts and Myths’ booklet and website discussed below, 
any judgement about the application of the analysis presented above to the 
proposed asset sales must be highly speculative and must rely, to a significant 
extent, on anecdotal and impressionistic evidence. 
Given that qualification, it seems plausible to conclude that the sale of the 
timber harvesting rights held by Queensland Forests is likely to produce 
operating benefits arising from the end of political control. It has long been 
claimed that forest products are underpriced and that politically influential 
logging interests receive unduly favorable treatment, while pressure to maintain 10 
employment levels leads to unsustainable harvesting (McDonald 1999). 
Privatisation may be expected to lead to more commercial pricing. 
The effect on the sustainability of harvesting will depend on the extent to which 
the reduction of pressures for increased output in the short term is offset by the 
higher discount rate and shorter time horizon associated with equity financing.  
Some problems may also arise from regulatory issues associated with the 
multiple use character of public forests. Recreational, environmental and water 
supply uses may conflict with the desire to maximise returns from forestry. 
The ports (Port of Brisbane and the coal ports) are capital-intensive operations 
with relatively low variable costs, so the potential for improvements in operating 
efficiency is limited.  Under competition policy, the rate of return for the 
associated monopoly assets is determined by regulation. This should imply a low 
level of risk and therefore a relatively small equity risk premium. 
The case of Queensland Motorways is the least favorable to privatisation. The 
Motorway is a highly capital-intensive operation, with little scope for efficiency 
improvements. More importantly, motorways are assets which form part of a 
transport network and therefore generate substantial externalities. Hence, the 
socially optimal rules for pricing and for access to the motorway (such as the 
number and location of on-ramps and off-ramps) will bear little if any relation to 
the settings that would maximise profitability.  
The risk allocation associated with privatisation violates the fundamental 
principle that risk should be allocated to the party best able to manage it. In the 
case of usage-based revenue for an urban road, that party is the owner of the 
urban transport network as a whole, that is the government. A private owner 
must demand a substantial risk premium in addition to the standard risk 
premium. Privatisation in cases of this kind is a recipe for rent-seeking and 
resource misallocation. A more detailed critique is given by Guest (2010). 
Finally, the most complex case is that of the coal operations of Queensland Rail. 
Rail privatisation has proved problematic around the world. The privatisation of 11 
British Rail was partially unwound in 2005, with the return of the network 
owner Railtrack to public ownership. Train services remain in private ownership 
on a competitive franchise basis (for passengers) and freight, where two 
successors of the British Rail operation share the market.  Privatization was 
notably unsuccessful in New Zealand. The entire system has now returned to 
public ownership. 
On the other hand, public ownership has also proved problematic. Critics have 
pointed to over-staffing and restrictive work practices as a problem in 
Queensland Rail and other publicly owned railways (Soorley 2010). Decisions on 
the introduction, and even more on the withdrawal, of rail services are likely to 
be determined on the basis of political rather than economic criteria. Among the 
most controversial have been cuts to the Cattletrain service, which has long been 
unprofitable as a result of competition from road transport (Douglas and Stephen 
2008, Paterson 2009). 
A central problem for policymakers arises from the natural monopoly aspects of 
the rail network. Efficiency typically requires that a single enterprise should 
own an manage the entire network in a given geographical area. The boundaries 
of the optimal network are determined by the extent of interconnection, which 
may in turn reflect historical factors such as gauge differences and state borders. 
 
There are some economies of scope between management of the rail network and 
of the trains that run on it. Thus, public enterprises have typically been 
organised as vertically integrated monopolies. However, recent reforms in many 
jurisdictions have sought, with mixed success, to encourage structural separation 
between network ownership and train operation. Where this has not taken place, 
as in Queensland, third-party access regimes have been implemented, again with 
mixed (and in Queensland’s case, very limited) success. 
As discussed above, the problems of regulating monopoly are commonly 
exacerbated by privatisation. As the case of Telstra has shown, these problems 12 
are compounded when a vertically integrated firm is privatised intact. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore both customers and competitors of QR have expressed 
opposition to the proposed sale (Marx 2009, McKay 2010) 
3. The Myths vs the Facts: Which is Which 
The case presented to the Queensland public and other concerned parties for the 
proposed $15 billion in asset sales consisted of a small booklet entitled ‘The 
Myths vs The Facts: Queensland Asset Sales’. More recently, the government 
has developed a web site (Queensland Treasury 2010) in which the booklet is 
reproduced, along with a brief restatement of its main points. There are also 
summaries of unreleased scoping studies, which contain no analysis, but give 
information on the proposed sale procedure. 
It is unclear where the government derived its ‘myths’, since none are attributed 
to any source, and most appear to be simple straw men, set up to be demolished 
with talking points supporting the government’s position. The most striking 
example is  
Myth: These businesses are cheap to run. 
Fact: Keeping these businesses would cost the Government more than $10 
billion over the next five years. That’s more than $10 billion spent on new coal 
trains and new wharves for the private sector that can’t be spent on roads, 
schools or hospitals. 
The statement is quoted as ‘Myth’ . The only relevant hit produced by a Google 
search is the ‘Myths and Facts’ booklet itself. Nevertheless, properly interpreted, 
the ‘mythical’ statement is accurate. These businesses generate sufficient 
revenue to cover operating costs and interest on their debt, and to generate a 
return on equity of around 5 per cent. Thus, from the viewpoint of the public as 
owners, they are, in this sense, cheap to run. Indeed, since they are profitable, 
the cost of running them is negative,. 
By contrast, the response stated as ‘Fact’ contains so many errors in such a short 13 
piece of text it is hard to know where one error ends and the next begins. First, 
the statement that keeping the businesses would ‘cost the government more than 
$10 billion’ for new coal trains and wharves implies that this amount is lost to 
the public, whereas in fact it would be an income generating investment  in 
low-risk monopoly or near-monopoly businesses. 
Conversely, the claim that this money could be spent on ‘roads, schools or 
hospitals’ neglects the fact that these assets, while they produce a flow of 
services generate no net revenue for governments to service the associated debt. 
The fact that selling assets does not provide an additional ‘pot of money’ to 
finance new public expenditure, current or capital, has been pointed out 
repeatedly by economists over several  decades.   
This statement was a central focus of the critique of the government’s case put 
forward by more than twenty leading economists of all persuasions. The 
government offered no defence, but also no retraction. 
The other striking feature of the claim is the reference to the provision of capital 
infrastructure ‘for the private sector’. This reference implies that the 
infrastructure is, in some sense, a gift to private businesses, when in reality it is 
priced on a commercial basis. The error is even more striking in view of the 
suggestion that the money derived from asset sales could be used to provide new 
roads, which would be provided free of charge to road users, including private 
businesses. 
In relation to this supposed refutation of a myth, the economists’ statement 
observed  
This claim  is economically unsound. Forgoing income 
generating investments, and borrowing an equal amount to 
fund investments that return no additional revenue, leaves 
the government with no flow of income to service the 
associated debt. The necessary income must be  raised by 
increasing taxes or cutting expenditure. 
The other notable claim in the booklet was 14 
MYTH: The five commercial businesses the Government plans to sell generate a 
lot of income for the State 
FACT: The total return from all five businesses in 2008-09 was approximately 
$320 million. This is less than 0.9% of the Government’s income. For every $100 
of Government income that’s less than 90 cents. When the sale process is 
completed, it is anticipated the Government will save $1.8 billion every year in 
interest payments (italics added). 
The economists’ statement observed 
This is an invalid, apples-and-oranges comparison. The $320 
million figure consists solely of dividend payouts, excluding 
retained earnings, tax-equivalent payments3
The $1.8 billion represent the interests that would be saved, 
at a rate of about 6 per cent, if the state realised $15 billion 
from the asset sale and avoided $12 billion in new 
investment.  Most of this interest would be serviced out of the 
revenues of the GBEs, and can therefore not be compared 
with dividends derived from earnings after the payment of 
interest and tax. 
 and the interest 
paid by the government business enterprises to service their 
debts. 
In the version now appearing on the Web, the sentence, italicised above, 
claiming that the government will save $1.8 billion a year in interest payments 
has been dropped. In addition, the ‘Myth’ has been modified to remove reference 
to the fact that the assets for sale are commercial businesses. 
As noted in the economists statement, the calculation is based on the interest 
savings from an estimated sale price of $15 billion and avoided investment of $12 
billion, at an interest rate of about 6.5 per cent. This is erroneous because about 
half of the sale price will be needed to repay debt held by the enterprises and 
serviced from their cash flows. Similarly, the $12 billion in new investment may 
be assumed  to generate a sufficient (regulated) return to cover at least the bond 
rate of interest on the associated increase in net debt. So, the true reduction in 
                                            
3 Subsequent advice, received indirectly from the government, was that the $320 million 
included tax-equivalent payments. 15 
interest arises from the fact that the equity component of the sale price may be 
used to repay debt. Assuming $7.5 billion in net proceeds and a 6.5 per cent 
interest rate, the saving is around $500 million. 
The relevant comparator here would be the earnings generated by the 
enterprises, including dividends, tax equivalent payments, retained earnings 
and capital gains on holdings of land and other assets. The ‘Facts and Myths’ 
booklet indicates that the first two items totalled $320 million which suggests 
that, on the conservative assumption that this sum would remain unchanged in 
nominal terms, the net gain to the government is $180 million a year, less 
retained earnings and capital gains. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the likely earnings 
of these enterprises. The most recent pretax earnings of the Port of Brisbane and 
QR were $332 million4
In the absence of a detailed scoping study, it is impossible to tell whether the 
government’s fiscal position would be improved or worsened by asset sales. It is 
unclear whether the government has undertaken such a comprehensive study, 
but declined to release the results, or whether the published extracts, dealing 
only with the implementation of a predetermined decision to sell, represent the 
entirety of the government’s analysis.  
 and $221 million, for a total of $553 million. This is more 
than the interest saving from debt repayment without taking account of the 
other asset sales. However, these figures include some extraordinary gains from 
the revaluation of land and other investments. 
The case 
Some supporters of asset sales have argued that the validity or otherwise of the 
public case for privatisation policies is a matter of little concern (Gittins 2008, 
Sim 2009). Gittins arges that governments may find it politically undesirable to 
acknowledge their true motives. In particular, he suggests, Labor governments 
may favor privatisation as a way of reducing the power of public sector unions, 
                                            
4 This excludes a $275 million profit on the sale of shares in Brisbane Airport, but includes other 16 
but may prefer to market asset sales on the basis of spurious claims such as 
those presented to the Queensland public. 
The experience of the Queensland asset sales reveals that this apparently 
sophisticated reasoning is, in fact, dangerously naïve. Spurious justifications for 
public policy distort the process of evaluation, design and implementation, 
producing poor policy outcomes. 
The need to maintain a spurious public case for privatisation implies the 
impossibility of any serious process of policy evaluation within the government. 
Such a policy process must create official or unofficial records which may become 
public as a result of uncontrolled leaks5
For most of the assets selected for sale, it is possible to make a fairly plausible 
case for private ownership. In the case of Queensland Motorways, however, there 
is ample evidence that private ownership of toll roads is inefficient and 
undesirable. In a proper public process, these issues could be addressed and 
debated. However, since the government has relied the spurious claim that the 
asset sales represent a method of raising money to fund investment in social 
infrastructure, the real economic issues have been ignored. 
. Hence, participants in the policy process 
must act, to a substantial extent, as if the purported case for privatisation is the 
actual basis for policy. In the case of the Queensland asset sales, the effects of a 
distorted policy process may be seen in the selection of assets for sale, the 
presence or absence of industry restructuring prior to sale and the mechanisms 
chosen for the sale. 
The problem of industry structure is most evident in the case of the QR coal 
freight business. A concern with economic efficiency would imply that the 
business should be subject to structural separation before sale. The rail network 
should be sold as a regulated monopoly, with the freight train business being 
sold as a competitive basis (even if it is currently the dominant firm). However, 
                                                                                                                                         
valuation gains, which have been earned consistently in recent years. 
5 The vast majority of are controlled by the government of the day. By providing information on 
an unattributable basis to favored journalists, governments can influence their media coverage in 
a desirable direction. But any secret policy process runs the risk that a disaffected employee or 17 
such a process would be likely to reduce the sale price. Since the government’s 
stated rationale is to raise  as much money as possible, this option has been 
rejected. 
The method of privatisation is similarly inappropriate. If the privatisation of QR 
is to allow for improved operating efficiency, it must involve the introduction of 
new owners and managers. This would occur most naturally through a trade sale 
to an existing firm with expertise in rail transport. However, such an option has 
not been pursued, presumably because the current market offers few appealing 
options. Instead, the sale is to take the form of a public float, marketed at 
Queensland households, with the government retaining a shareholding large 
enough to secure effective control. Thus, for practical purposes, the enterprise 
will continue to be controlled by the Queensland government and the managers 
it appoints. 
Concluding comments 
In a democratic society, decisions involving public assets worth billions of dollars 
should be made on the basis of a properly informed public debate. Where these 
decisions involve a reversal of long-standing policies, they should be put to the 
electorate to obtain a public mandate. Neither of these conditions have been met 
in the case of the Queensland asset sales. 
Democratic processes are desirable in themselves, but even more desirable 
because they have shown themselves, in the long run, to produce more beneficial 
outcomes than any alternative. The Queensland asset sales illustrate this point. 
The determination of the government to ram through a policy directly 
contradictory to its own election platform, on the basis of flimsy and spurious 
justifications has produced a poor selection of assets to be sold, anti-competitive 
decisions on structural reform and a sale process that seems sure to produce poor 
fiscal returns and poor outcomes for the economic performance of the assets as a 
whole. 
                                                                                                                                         
politician might leak information about its existence. 18 
At this point, the only sensible option is to abandon the sale process altogether 
and begin a fresh consideration of the government’s fiscal strategy. Since it 
seems highly unlikely that this will be done, the only remedy remaining to the 
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Press Release: Queensland Government Case For Asset Sales 
‘Economically Unsound’; Informed Public Debate Needed 
A group of prominent Australian academic and business economists has issued a 
statement describing the case presented by the Queensland government in 
support of its proposed asset sales as ‘economically unsound’ and ‘based on 
spurious claims’ The statement concludes that ‘The people of Queensland 
deserve a robust and well-informed public debate over the costs and benefits of 
privatisation. So far they have not received it.’ 
The group encompasses a broad range of views on the merits of privatisation  
—some might favour it in particular cases whilst others would be less likely to. 
However, all are agreed that such important decisions should be made on the 
basis of well-informed discussion. Important issues include whether the private 
or public sector would be the most efficient managers, which would be the best 
bearers of the business risk and the best ways for the enterprise to meet social as 
well as financial objectives. 
The group includes twelve professors of economics from four leading Queensland 
universities and nationally prominent academic and business economists 
including current and former members of the Board of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia. 
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Statement by academic and business economists on the Queensland 
government’s case for asset sales 
 
Decisions on the sale or retention of public assets have important implications 
for competition and public policy, as well as for the fiscal position of 
governments. These decisions cannot  be resolved on the basis of general 
ideological arguments for or against public ownership, and require informed 
public debate in each case. The normal lines of economic debate include whether 
a given business is more efficiently operated in the private or public sector, the 
appropriate allocation of risk and the extent to which the enterprise is required 
to pursue social as well as financial objectives. 
The signatories of this statement have a range of views on the appropriate 
balance between the public and private sectors and on the merits of privatisation 
in particular cases. However, we share the view that these questions should be 
resolved on the basis of well-informed discussion of the economic and social costs 
and benefits of privatisation, and not on the basis of spurious claims that asset 
sales represent a costless source of income to governments. 
The arguments put forward by the Queensland government in its booklet ‘Facts 
and Myths on Asset Sales’ do nothing to promote a well-informed debate. Two 
central claims are particularly, and sadly, noteworthy. In relation to five public 
assets proposed for sale, the "Facts and Myths"  booklet states 
 Keeping these businesses would cost the Government $12 billion over the next five 
years. That’s $12 billion spent on new coal trains and new wharves that can’t be 
spent on roads, schools or hospitals. 
This claim is economically unsound. Forgoing income generating investments, 
and borrowing an equal amount to fund investments that return no additional 
revenue, leaves the government with no flow of income to service the associated 
debt. The necessary income must be raised by increasing taxes or cutting 
expenditure. 23 
Selling public assets will improve the public sector’s fiscal position only if the 
price realised for the assets exceeds the value of the income stream that the 
asset would otherwise generate for the public sector. In this respect, the ‘Facts 
and Myths’ booklet states 
The total return from all five businesses in 2008-09 was approximately $320 
million When the sale process is completed, it is anticipated the Government will 
save $1.8 billion every year in interest payments. 
This is an invalid, apples-and-oranges comparison. The $320 million figure 
consists solely of dividend payouts, excluding retained earnings, tax-equivalent 
payments and the interest paid by the government business enterprises to 
service their debts. 
The $1.8 billion represent the interests that would be saved, at a rate of about 6 
per cent, if the state realised $15 billion from the asset sale and avoided $12 
billion in new investment.  Most of this interest would be serviced out of the 
revenues of the GBEs, and can therefore not be compared with dividends derived 
from earnings after the payment of interest and tax. 
The people of Queensland deserve a robust and well-informed public debate over 
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